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In the Supreme Court
of the State of lJtah
RU8H; KLA.B"l'A,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
j.LBEHT N".

N~I ITH,

dba OX RANCH,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
~TA'l'E~IENT

OF' KIND OF CASE

This is an aetion for personal injuries arising out

of a <'olli::.;ion between the automobile in which Respond-

ent

riding and a dead cow owned by Appellant. Said
cow had been killed by another car driven by one Cox
:md left l»ing on the highway.
was

DT~POSl'l'ION

IN LOWER COURT

The <.'a:oie was tried to a jury on special interrogatoriP,,. Tlw answers of the jury were inconsistent. Respundent filed a motion for judgment n.o.v., for additur,
and in the alternative for a new trial on damages only.
f)n De('emlwr 3, 19fi4, the Court entered the following
ruling:

"In this matter the evidence shows without
dispntP that the animal involved in the collision
hPre in qtIPstion had escaped from the vehicle

of the defendants. The Court is of the opinirin
that Seetion 27 -1-33, U CA, 1953, was violated Iii
the escape of the animal in question. Under tli~
provisions of Section 27-1-34, UCA, 1953, !ht
plaintiff is entitled to recover her damages. Tht
motion of the plaintiff for judgment notwith
stand the verdict is granted.
"A new trial is granted on the issue of the
plaintiff's damages.
"Dated and sigrn•d this 3rd day of Deeen1
her, 1964.
R. L. TUCKETT
R. L. TUCKETT, Judge"

RELIEF 80UGH'l' ON INTERMEDIATE APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of that part of saia
ruling to the effect that Section 27-1-33 and Section
27-1-34, U CA, 1953, were violated by the escape of the
animal in question and that plaintiff is entitled to re·
cover her damages, and that the motion of the plaintili
notwithstanding the verdict is granted and a new tria!
is granted on the issue of damages only.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case has been tried twice. The first trial wa;
before the Honorable Aldon Anderson and a jury. The
jury returned a verdict for defendant. Judge .Ander·
son felt that his instructions relating to proximate cause
were incorrect and so on a motion by plaintiff for a new
'
·1
trial as to damages only the Court granted a new tna
on all issues. The next trial was before the Honorahlf
R. L. 'l'uckett and a jury. .Judge Tuckett submitteil
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tltr <·as(' to tl1,· .inr~· on special interrogatories. The
ans11rrs returned ll~· the jury were inconsistent. Respornkr1t tltf•n filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. or for
adclitnr, or in the alternative for a new trial 011 damages
only. Un Deeember ;j, 1963, the Court entered an order
.~ranting Hep011dn:t's petition for judgment n.o.v and
'.!rantrd Hespondent a new trial on damages only.
TJ1en·upon ,\ppellant petitioned this Court for an intermPdiatP ap1wal, which was granted on December 15,
1964.
This 1s an action brought by Respondent against
,\ppellant for ]Jersonal injuries which she is alleged to
have :·mffered in an accident which took place in Tooele
County on llecernlier 29, 1961, on Highway 40 about 45
mi!Ps Ea:-t of ·wendover, Utah. Appellant operates a
livestoek rmwh in Hub:; Valley, Nevada. At the time
of th:' accident he was the owner of a truck upon which
ll'as rnnstrn<'.ted a cattle rack which he used for transporting livestock from his ranch to the Ogden StockYards at Ogden, rtah, for sale. On December 29, 1961,
he 1MH1Pd in said rack seven grown cows and two grown
bulls and started for Ogden. When he reached a point
apprn:xima tel~· five miles West of Grantsville, Utah,
he wa:s flagged down hy the driver of a following car
and told that his tailgate on said rack was loose, whereupon he stopped and found that the tailgate had loosened
and three cows and one bull were missing. He immediately replaced the tailgate in its proper sockets, replaeed two bolts which were then missing, turned around
on the highway and traveled back about 40 miles in
«eareh of the missing animals, when he came to the
srene of th0 accident.

Neil Bishop, a trooper for the
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Utah High\vay Patrol, investigated the accident. He
arrived at the scene at about 7 :15 p.rn. He received t] 11•
call at about 6 :45 p.m. when he was about 50 miles Ea,t
from the scene of the accident. He described the rnad
as having two lanes of traffic, divided by a hroken wliitP
center line, on level terrain, no hills or obstructions, and
straight. The road was of asphalt composition. I!
was dry, just in average condition ('l'r. 13), with no particular defects. It had been chipped, whirh helps to
reflect some light. It is not like a road of new-laid
mix, which tends to absorb most all of the headlight~
(Tr. 14). He observed a 1961 Cadillac (the car in which
Respondent was riding) on its right hand side of thf'
roadway at a point indicated on a diagram placed by
him on the blackboard. He also observed a 1956 Pontial'
(Cox' car) on the left hand shoulder and some distance
back of a puddle of radiator fluid, whieh indicated tlw
probable final position of the Pontiac. He also noticed
heavy, swerving marks at a point indicated on !lie '
drawing, some gouge marks, and 9' 8" of skid
marks (evidently made by the Klafta car). He also
noticed a dead black cow. It had been removed from
its final position prior to his arrival. The animal wai
black (Tr. 15). The point "pp-1" was identified as tlw
probable point of impact of the Cox car where it could
possibly have hit the cow, and "pp-2" as the possible
point of impact of the Klafta car where it could have
had the collision with the cow. The skid marks from r
PP-2 showed a swerving, heavy black smear leading to
Cadillac. They were caused, he believed, by the left
front wheel being locked (Tr. 15). In the collision the
distribution of the fender and parts had ('ompletely
1
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lotked that "·Jipe] (Tr. 16) and kept it lorked on that
~idP. 'J'hese 111arks (•xtended a distance of 120' covered
liY the Klafta C'ar as it traveled West from the point
of irnpad, s\\'erving and c:orning to rest ('l'r. 17). The
front encl of the Klafta car was quite heavily damaged,
indicating that the <larnage had been inflicted by a colli~ion at a fairl.'· low center of gravity to the vehicle. The
('ox vehiele showed heavy damage to the hood, headlights and top (Tr. 17), which was a basis for his stating that the vehicle went underneath and the cow was
propelled up over the top of the vehicle and stopped
on the roadway behind it (Tr. 18). On cross-examination he stated that maintenance and chipping of the
road is done regularly as the road needs it, and this is
a factor in lighting the road\Vay, making it more of a
lighter textured surface than travel wear will do to it.
Tlie weather was dear. It was a dark night. The road
'urface was dry, no fog, no mist or dust in the air (Tr.
32). It was ascertained that the Cox car was the first
to hit tlw animal (Tr. 34). The Cox car was facing
West, partially on the roadway, so that the rear end
of the Cox car would be faring an oncoming car from
the East. 'l'he Cox car had red reflectors on the rear
arnl tl1e ligl1ts from an oncoming car would reflect them,<dre' into the rear. As the lights hit the surface they
would definitPl.\· reflect back ('l'r. 36). They would be
visible for prnhahly, under most conditions, 250 to 300
fept as a minimum. The Cox car was partially on the
:i,phalt pmtion of the' highway (Tr. 37). He estimated
that thP top of the animal would be about 36" above the
'urfare of thP highway. The appearanre of the marks
on the higlmay \rnnld indi«ate that the Klafta car was
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braked and it::-; wheels loeked for a distance of 9' 8"
before striking the carcass ('l'r. 38). 'l'he Klafta car
started to brake 9' 8" East of the point of impact and
then ('Ontinued over the cow and down the highway for
a distance of 125 feet before it came to rest (Tr. 39).
J._ copy prepared by the witness of the drawing on the
blackboard was offered in evidence marked "P-1" and
received in evidence (Tr. 41). Rose Klafta testified
concerning the happening of the accident that she wa> :
an occupant in the Klafta car that becam(· involved m
the accident (Tr. 42). She was seated in the front
:,;eat next to the driver and her lrn:,;band, Bruno seated
in the rear seat. That her son, Richard, was the driver:
that they had come from Kankakee, Illinois, and were
enroute to Sacramento, California; that there were no
cars in front of them (Tr. 44). (Note: The Cox tar
must have been a considerable distance ahead of tlw111
when he struck and killed the cow.) She saw this blark
object in front of them. Richard applied hi~ l1rake'
real hard and we hit some hard object (Tr. 45). Jn<t
before the accident she said to Richard, "Thank Gorl
for bringing us this far in safety." (Tr. 62). There
were no seat belts in the car. She was thrown forward
and the seat came back with her. She admitted that if she
had had a seat belt on she was sure it wouldn't havr
(Tr. 63).
1

1
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Richard Klafta (Tr. 70) testified that they left
Kankakee on the 27th day of December around 4:00
p.m. (Tr. 72). He did all the driving. They arrived in
Salt Lake Citv late in the afternoon but did not stop,
and continued- on Highway 40. The accident happened
about 6 :30 or 6 :35. In describing how the accident
6

lwppened he said, "I was driving down R0ntP 40 and
all of a sudden lien~ wa8 thi8 big critter. I yelled 'Look
11 tit', :rnd put 1n:-: right arm up, hit the brakes, and bang,
we hit it. i\ly lights were on dim. Sometime before I
notieecl lights way off in the distance and he flicked at
JJH' and r did the same to him and left them on dim.
I
rlid not reduee my speed. I was traveling about 50
On cross-examination he
111 iles per hour." (Tr. 75).
admitted that in a ·written statement signed by him he
;;lated he was traveling between 50 and 55 miles per
hour (rl'r. 81); that he did not reduce his speed when he
dimmed his lights to low beam (Tr. 83). He further
stated tliat this was a barren country but he did not
remember SPPing any signs "Watch for Cattle" (Tr. 85).

DEFENSE
Appellant Smith was asked the following question: "~peaking specifically about the rack, who con'trnded it, who manufactmed it?" Objected to by
Hespondent as heing immaterial, and the objection was
sustained hy the Court. The Court then indicated that
it was his view that Appellant could not go into any
matter~ tending to prove justification or excuse (Tr.
108). Ap1wllant's counsel, in the absence of the jury,
madP a proffer of proof, which is set out in the transeript at pages 109 to 111, inclusive. Upon objection to
the offer hy Respondent the Court stated (Tr. 111),
"Well, the Court feels that the offer of proof, if the
~vidPnep were such, it would not amount to a justifil'ation for violation of the statute we have here." Upon
inqnir)' hy Appellant's counsel as to what issues would
he trit•d the ( 'ourt stated, "Well, I think your other
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issue is the negligence of plaintiff driver being the sol .
proximate e;ause of the collision." Appellant then u!fered in evidence the pleadings set forth in Respondent",
second cause of action wherein Respondent allPgeu that
defendant Cox 'vas guilty of primary negligence whid!
caused the injury, as bearing on the issues of prnximat«
cause. Upon this offer, which was objeded to by Hespondent, the Court stated, "In that respect the Cour!
is of the opinion that while the plaintiff may have
originally made claim against defendant Cox, he wao
not brought into the proceedings by service of prom'
and I doubt whether plaintiff's bare claim alone would
establish that defendant Cox was guilty of any negligence. The offer is denied." (Tr. 112-113). Thereupon
Appellant proceeded with his defense on tlw sole isrne
of negligence of Richard Klafta as the sole cause of
the accident. Apvellant then testified that the weathPr
was dry, clear and cool. Visibility was very good. No
dust, rain, wind or fog, and lights are a lot better on a
dark night (Tr. 113). A picture marked "Exhibit 4"
and received in evidence showed a sign on the right hand
side of the highway some distance West of Grantsville
on the desert. "Exhibit 5" showed one of three sign>
as they existed on the date of the accident (Tr. 115) an<l
was received in evidence. He further testified that
there are other signs along the highway between Grant>
ville and the scene of the accident reading "Range Cattle". The country is open range known as the desert
but contains winter feed that cattle and sheep winter
on. There were cattle grazing in that general area
(Tr. 117). This animal weighed about 1,200 lbs. anrl
was a black Angus with white spots on her flank an<l
belly.
8

Donald E~. Green was a driver for P. T. E. He testifi<'d that he \ms JriYing Ea::;t on No. 40; that the night
was dear, visibility good, and that visibility is much
better on a dear, dark night. You tan see better if
there is an» object on the highway in front of you.
He wal' 200 or 300 yards back when he observed the
!whL'
of ;in oncoming car approaching and all of a
,-,
,;ndden the)- jumped into the air 3 or 4 feet, then the
ear ll!ade violent swerves and went to the right hand
,ide of the road; that he did not believe he signalled for
dimming lights because he was too far away (Tr. 121).
The ruling of the Court restricting Appellant to
the one issue of whether or not Richard Klafta was
guilty of ngeligence which was the sole cause of the injuries, restricted Appellant in offering evidence as
to the other affirmative defense hereinafter to be discussed.

ARGUMENT
POIN11 I. The Court erred in entering its order
that urJon the retrial of this action the only issue will
be that of damages, thus in effect holding that as a matter of law Appellant violated Section 27-1-33 and Section 27-1-3.+, U.C.A. 1953, and that such violation constituted negligence per se and was the proximate cause
of Respondent's injury.
POINT II. That such ruling by the Court precludes
Appellant from offering any evidence in support of
his defense of contributory negligence of Respondent
and tht• issue of proximate cause.
POINT III. That such ruling by the Court preelude~ Appellant from offering any evidence in support
9

of his defense that Richard Klafta, the driver of the
car in which Respondent was riding, was guilty of
negligence, which negligence on his part was the· sole
cause of the accident and resulting injury to Respond.
ent.
POIN1.1 IV. That on the retrial of this action Ap.
pellant should he permitted to offer evidence in support
of each of the foregoing defenses and the same should
be submitted to the jury as questions of fact rather than
questions of law for the Court.
POINT V. That the trial court erred in sustaining objections to Appellant's proffered evidence.
POINT VI. That the trial court erred in instrurtions given to the jury.
POINT VII. That the trial court erred in refusinv
to give to the jury instructions as requested by Appellant.
Point I. With respect to the offer of proof made
by Appellant we desire to call attention to the case of
Condas v. Adams, 15, Utah 2d 132, 388 P. 2d 803. Plain·
tiff sued for rent under a farm lease. Defendant filed
a counter-claim alleging fraud. On the morning of the
trial a conference was held in Chambers. Judge Ellett
asked counsel for defendant what his proof would IJe
and after discussion of the matter the Judge then dismissed the counter-claim. This court made the follo 1'··
ing observation:
"Further, the trial court's dismissal of tlw
counter-claim is akin to the granting of a surrunarr
judgment and therefore the proposed proof and

!
1

1
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I

every inferencf' arising therefrom must he viewed
ill ihe lig;hl rnost favorable to the defendants. It
is with these legal principles in mind that the
defendaHts' offer of proof must be reviewed."
'J'Jip order of the Court in our case granting a new trial
JJ,· restricting it to damages only is also akin to the
granting of a summary judgment against Appellant,
and the above observations by the Court should also
apply in eonsi<lering Appellant's offer of proof.

ease has already been tried twice. The first
trial. before the Honorable Aldon Anderson, resulted
iu n no cause verdict. Judge Anderson, however, felt
he had erred in defining proximate cause in his in,<tructions and so he granted a new trial on all issues,
although Re::-pondent moved for a new trial restricting
it to damages only.
~'his

The seeond trial was before the Honorable R. L.
Tuckett. He submitted special interrogatories and the
.iury hecame eonfnsed in answering the interrogatories,
whicl1 rpsulted in their bringing in of an inconsistent
rerdict. His first interrogatory is as follows:
"Di<l the defendant violate the statute here
m question by failing to properly secure the
livestock to prevent their escape? Answer yes
or no."
Hi~ ~eeond interrogatory is as follows:

"Was the defendant's violation of the statute
a proximate cause of' the plaintiff's injury and
darnage '! Answer yes or no."

11

Interrogatory No.
lowing form:

~

should have heen asked in the fol

"If your ans\rnr to Interrogatory No. J if
yes, then you will answer plaintiff's Interrogatory
No. 2."

In the absence of this clarifying statement the jury could
not help being confused by reason of the Court's stating
as a positive fact that the defendant's violation of tlw
statute was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injur~- and
damage. After the jury had been out for some considerable time they asked for further instructions, and
thereupon the Court entered into a discussion with the
jury. See Tr. commencing on page 165 and continuin~
to page 170. We think the actions of the Court constltuted reversible error. See Cornia v. Albertson'i,
________________Utah ________________ , 397 P. 2d 66.

1

Appellant does not object to the granting of a m·w
trial for the reasons hereinbefore set out, but strenuously ,
objects to that part of the order which limits the third 1
trial to damages only. It is from this part of the ruling '
that Appellant appeals. The effect of the Court's order
is that Judge Tuckett has held that as a matter of law
Appellant violated the provisions of Section 27-1-33;
U.C.A. 1953; that such violation was the proximate
cause of the accident and resulting injuries suffered b)·
Respondent; that Respondent was not guilty of contributory negligence; and that Richard Klafta, the
driver of the car in which Respondent was riding, was
either not guilty of negligence or that his negligence was
not the sole cause of the accident. We contend that all
of these issues presented questions of fact for the jury'>

1

1
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dctu1;1ii~t'cion

nnde r pro1ier instructions.

We further

('on(en<l that if ..:\ pvellant is permitted to offer evidence

to justific:ation or exeuse, as set forth in the offer
f
proof
liereinafter discussed, and the jui·y finds that
11
under al I tlie circumstances surrounding the accident
"~iwllant was justified or excused from said violation,
then it must follow that Appellant did not violate Seclion27-1-:33 and if he did not violate this section then
he did not violate Section 27-1-34, which applies only to
and when he violates Section 27-1-33. This section is
,ornewliat :unliig-uout-\. Subdivision (a) provides as follows:

a~

"No vehicle shall be driven or moved on any
highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or
loaded as to prevent its contents from dropping,
shifting, leaking or otherwise escaping therefrom."
Then ( b) provides :
"No person shall operate on any highway any
vehicle ·with any load unless said load and any
covering thereon is suitably fastened, secured and
ronfied ac-cording to the nature of such load so as
to prevent said covering or load from becoming
loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to
other users of the highway." (Emphasis added.)
It is a matter of common knowledge that no coverare plaeed over trucks holding livestock. Therefore, we must ai:;sume that subdivision (b) relates to
truch hauling merchandise and similar articles which
are covered while in transit. Otherwise, subdivisions
la) and (b) nre s.rnonymous. We think, therefore, that
13
ing~

the only statute involved in this case is subdivision
(a), but irrespective of this, and whether it app!ic 8 t1,
(a) or (b), we contend that Appellant should be permitted to offer the evidenee set forth in his offer of proof
that his truck was so constructed and loaded as to pre
vent the cattle from escaping therefrom but due to ai1
unfortunate accident for which Appellant was not re
sponsible or which could not be prevented by the mr
cise of reasonable and ordinary care and caution, thP
three cattle escaped from said truck. Conceding for
the purpose of this argument only that Appellant did
violate the above statute, then we next consider the
important question as to whether such violation constitutes negligence per se, rendering him liable as a
matter of law, or whether a violation of a statute 8Uch a>
the one in question raised a presumption of negligcnc1,
which may be overcome by other eYidence showing that
under all the circumstances surrounding the event the
conduct of Appellant was excusable or justifiablr and
such as might reasonably have been expected fr0w a 1
person of ordinary prudence, and that this presents 11
question of fact to be submitted to the jury under proper
instructions. We desire to call the Court's attention
to the case of White v. Piney 90 Utah 484, 19~
P. 2d 249. Defendant was a wholesaler of beer. Neslen
was his driver of a truck making deliveries. Plaintiff'i
truck was parked to the curb headed south on Highland
Drive. Plaintiff was standing behind his truck takw~
out flowers for delivery to a florist. Defendant's ~takP
body truck was loaded with beer, barrels and ca'e~.
On the rack was a hand trnck or dolly used in unloading
and moving harrels of beer. As the truck passed plain

14

tiff':; trw·k u11t· wlt(·el of thP dolly ea11w off, croc.;sed the
0tre1:t and st rud; plaintiff. Verdict for defendant. Three
rr~ie"t10ns 'n'n' presented: (1) Was plaintiff entitled to
in:;tnwtio11 Uial <ld'endant was negligent as a matter
r,f J;nd (2) Did the Court err in submitting to the
inn the quPstion of contributory negligence of plaintiff! (3) ·wm~ instruetion 1;~ so erroneous as to require ren'Loal of tlw judgment? The Court first discu;;~es the question of re::; ipsa loqnitur.
The Court
then procPcds to discm;s instructions No. 12 and 13,
and as to 12 thP Court says:
"Instruction No. 12 is clear that liability
for defoets in a motor vehicle exists only (a)
when a defect was known, or (b) when it could
liave been discovered upon reasonable inspectinn. ft further made clear that if there was a
defeet in defendant's equipment they could not
Pscape liability unless the jury found not only that
the defect was unknown but that it could not
have hPen discovered by reasonable, prudent inspection."
llPfendant offerPd evidence (a) that the dolly was
faotened to the truek in a proper and secure way, (b)
that the whc'r>]s on the dolly were held in place by cotter
pinH, (c) that tliP~' had no knowledge of any defect in
the dolly or the way the wheel was fastened on, ( d) that
the hand truek or dolly had been regularly lubricated
Hnd iniipectcd OJH'P 01· twice each week, ( e) that it had
bl-'en tn-sPd that day
. shortlv
. before the accident ' was
in good eondition, and had nothing wrong with it, (f)
that whrn thP dollr was put back on the truck when last
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used :;hortly before the a<'ei<lent it worked all right :inri
:;eemed in good condition, and (g) that there was nothi 11~
to be seen about it to indicate it was not in good condition. 1'-,or :;ome reason the :;tatute involved in tf 11 ,
C'ase wa:; not raised eitlwr hy the Court or <·oun~el, ,, 1111
so the case ,nu; tried on the theory of cornmoH law negli
gence, but we think that the evi<lencP offered in that case
is so similar to our offor of proof that if thP theon r.t
justification or exeuse is permitted then the nfft>r 11f
proof would be :;ufficient to iwrmit a .imy to fin<l tliat
Appellant was justified or excused from the violation
of the statute, so that the real question involve<l ii
whether or not this Court will recognize the doetrinr
adopted in California and many other states that an
alleged violator may offer evidence of jnstifiration 111
excuse and that the ultimate question is one of fact for
a Jury.
Appellant admits that there is a division of authont:
on this question, hut we contend that this Court ha'
elected to follow the California rule that violation of a
statute such as the one in question raises only a pre:;umption of negligence. Berkovitz v. American Ri1n
Gravel Co. (Cal.), 215 Pae. 675, is perhaps the fir,!
California case to lay down clearly the rule. At pagr·
677 the Court says:
"The only question remammg open on thi>
point is 'vhether conclusive proof of the violation
of such a statute or ordinance is also concfo8in
proof of negligence. Some courts have held that
it is and :;01ne that it is not. But the true rule
is perfectly plain. 'l'he violation of such a Jaw
left without explanation or excuse, is conclusirc
16
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of negligence, but it may be excused. If some
good exeu:,;e appear:,; which would be a sufficient
defense to an action for the penalty imposed by
the law ... then the law is not really violated ...
We find but few cases in which this is clearly
stated, but they deserve to take preced€nce of
all the others, as they reconcile the principle
upon which the other cases were actually derided." (Citing Sherman & Redfield on Negligence, Section 467).
This wse is cited and ref erred to in most of the
involving the violation of a :statute or ordinance
sub~equent to the Berkovitz case.
For an instruction
approved hy California courts, together with a long
li,;t of cases l:lupporting the rule, see B.A.J.I., Third
RevisPd J<~dition, No. 149, commencing at page 187. Also
B.A .•J.I., Fourth Edition, No. 149, commencing at page
'.l8i. Also B.A.J.I. Supplement No. 149-149b, commencing at page 144.
l:tah cases.

l':t~e~

We adrnit that this Court has held that violation
of a statute or ordinance constitutes negligence as a
matter of law.
Smith 1:. Mine & Smelter Supply co., 32 Utah 21,
88 Pac. 683.

Skirt c. Wheeler Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 476, 69
P. 2d 502.

However, these cases involve a wilful violation of an
ordinaner govrrning the storage of dynamite and the
wilful violation of a :statute governing the keeping of
17

explosives. These two cases will he further discu~se<l
when we refer to the case of Thompson v. Ford Motor
Co. This Court, however, soon began to recognize tlrnt
the sweeping statement contained in the explosiw rasei
above referred to had limitations. 'l'he first casp 1ra,
White v. Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 Pac. 441, where the
trial court included the statement contained in the ex
plosive cases in one of its instructions to the jury. Jn
this case the defendant's team ran into the plaintiff 1
while defendant was driving to the left of center of
the street. This court reversed, holding that where ,
there was an excavation on the right side of the street
defendant was justified in driving on the left in vio- i
lation of the ordinances of Ogden City, in spite of the
sweeping language in the Mine & Smelter case.
Morrison v. Perry (on rehearing), 104Utah151,

140 P. 2d 772.
This court held "that the presumption of negligence on the part of defendant, arising from automo
bile collision on defendant's wrong side of the street,
ceases the moment an explanation is offered that the
evidence upon which the presumption was based remains in the case and is to be considered by the jury
unless there is no conflict between such evidence and
the explanatory evidence."
North v. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 229 P. 2n
871.
This case involved the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence in violating two traffic statute,,
from which we quote as follows :
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"Pl:tintiff's driving on the wrong side of the
street contrary to statute is prima facie evidence of negligence, and calls for an explanation
to justify his position upon the highway." (Emphasis added)
Robinson v. Robinson, ____________ Utah ____________ , 394, P.
2d 876.
While this case does not involve the violation of
a otatnte, it does involve the rule of absolute liability
and to that extent it is similar to our case in which the
trial court applied the rule of absolute liability for
l'iolating a statute. We quote from Mr. Justice McDonough, the author of this opinion, as follows:

"It is to be observed that even where the
circumstances justify its application, this socalled rule of absolute liability has the weaknesi:>
of most generalities. There are almost always
exceptions which prove them fallacious."
Further quoting:

"It will thus be seen that the so-called rule
of 'absolute liability' is not absolute at all. Both
the propriety of its application in the first instance, and any defenses against it, are conditioned by the limitations imposed by the fundamental standard which pervades all tort law:
the conduct of the reasonable prudent man under
the circumstances; and its procedural corollary,
that whenever there is a dispute in the evidence
or uncertainty therein as to whether that standard iR met, the question is one for the jury to
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determine." (Citing cases in the footnote.) (Em.
phasis added.)
We now come to the case of Thomvson v. Fri/ti
Motor Co., ____________ Utah 2d __________ , 395 P. 2d 62, decidP1] '
1

September 1, 1964, whieh we believe is conclusive of the !
question involved on this appeal. Plaintiff sued for injuries suffered when the parking brake on a Salt Lake
City garbage truck suddenly gave way so he was unable to get back into and control it. Plaintiff alleged
that the brake mechanism was defective. On the hasi,
of depositions of the plaintiff and his co-worker the 1
trial court ruled that plaintiff was contributorily neg
ligent as a matter of law, and granted defendant'o motion for summary judgment. The truck in question ira'
manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff took the truck to
the hilly avenue section of Northeast Salt Lake Cit1
to collect garbage. Plaintiff stopped the truck on a
steep grade headed downhill. On stopping, plaintiff
set the parking brake, got out and went to the rear to
collect garbage. He left the cab door open, left the
key in the ignition and the motor running. At about
the time the plaintiff turned to set down the cans some
thing snapped underneath the truck. The brake gare
way and the truck started to roll. Plaintiff ran forward
and grabbed the door but was unable to get into the
truck and was thrown to the ground, sustaining injurie'
The pivotal controversy devolves upon Section 41-6-lOJ,
U.C.A. 1953. We quote from the opinion hy Mr. Justiee
Crockett:
"The defendant contends that under the aLow
1
facts above recited the leaving of the truck un
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attended and the violation of the statute constitute
proof as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty
of negligence and that it proximately contributed
to cause his injury, which preeludes his recovery and justifies the summary judgment against
him. Plaintiff rejoins that notwithstanding the
statute, he is entitled to have his conduct judged
on the universally applied standard of care:
that of the reasonable, prudent man under the
circumstances. We are aware that it has sometimes been stated as a general rule that violation of the statutory standard of care is negligence as a matter of law. This i~ indeed a sound
rule but, like all generalities, it has its limitations and is applicable only under proper circumstanc('s." (Emphasis added)
Justite <'rnckett then cites and analyzes a number
of Ftah cases "·hich we have heretofore cited, and then
l'Ontinues:
"Subsequent to the North case just referred
io, this Court has in a number of cases but
with slight variations in the language reaffirmed
thP YiPw, which we think is the correct one, that
violation of a standard of safety set by statute
or ordinance is to he regarded as prima facie
evidence of negligence, but is subject to justifieation or ex<'use if the evidence is such that
it reasonably could be found that the conduct was
nevertlwless within the standard of reasonable
care undPr the circumstances." (Emphasis added)
l'iting- in tliP footnote, among others, the case of
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Alarid r. Va11ier, 327 P.2c1 897, with this comment:
''A well-written opinion which review 8 nu.
merous California decisions and states: •TJi1•
presumption of negligenee which arises on the
violation of a statute is rebuttable and may hP
overeome by evidence of justification or Pxe~ie."
Citing numerous law reviews and textboob in
support of the foregoing.

It would seem that Utah is now definately eomm
itted to the so-called California rule. While the statutP
involved in the 'l'hompson case is different from the
statute involved in our case, both relate to a standard
of care to be observed by operators of motor vehielrs.
We think that a violation of Section 41-6-105 referred
to in the Thompson case will expose more people tu
the hazards of life, limb and property that rf'sult from
a violation of Section 27-1-33. It is also noteworthy to
mention that all of the cases cited by us refer generalli
to any and all statutes, especially statutes or ordinanee'
relating to a standard of care to be observed hy operator,
of motor vehicles. When the trial court refused to allow
Appellant to offer evidence of justification or excuse,
Appellant made an offer of proof referred to in the
Statement of Facts which, if Appellant were permitted
to offer in evidence, would have made the questi 11 r1
of justification or excuse a question of fact for the
jury, and if the order of the trial court granting a TIP\\
trial on damages only is sustained Appellant will be
foreclosed from offering any evidence in the retrial
except as to damages. Appellant therefore feel' that
this question can be resolved in advance of the next
22
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1

trial an<l will probably avoid a fourth trial. The rule
of absolute liability i::,; a harsh one. 8uppose that a
trucker without fault loses a wheel on his truck, cau::,;ing it to overturn and and permit live::,;tock to escape,
or that he strikes an icy spot on the road or a sudden
wind of sufficient velocity causes his truck to overturn, or sudden floods eaused by heavy rains, or any
unforeseen defeets in the motor vehicle of which the
driver is unaware even though he makes a reasonable
inspection, to hold that he is guilty of a misdemeanor
subject to fine or imprisonment and civilly liable in
damages, with no opportunity to offer any evidence
of justification or excuse, is so harsh that it is no
wonder the courts have adopted the humanitarian doctrine which permits the alleged violator to offer explanatory evidence of justification or excuse. In Harper
:mrl .fames, Volume 2, Section 176, page 1010, the
author smmuarizes the situation as follows:
•·If negligence per se is tempered by the

doctrine of justifiable violation, it means that
violation of a statutory standard is negligence per
,;e in a civil case only in the absence of evidence
tending to establish some excuse which the court
will recognize. If there is such evidence the
reasonableness of the actor's conduct is for the
jury in the light of all the circumstances, including the statute and the justifiable reliance
that others may usually place on tis observance.
Now the evidence of negligence rule can be so
administered that every case is sent to the jury,
hut it i,; more often ruled that breach of the
,;tatute i l' Jlrirna faeie evidence of negligence
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so that a verdict of negligence will be direeterl
on such a sho-wing in the absence of sornP eridence tending to show factors of explanatio 11
excuse or justification . . . 1'here seems to 111' a
perceptible trend in the decisions in a nurnhei
of states towards just such an expansion of the
negligence per se rule."
A number of cases support the above statement.
Baldridge v. Cmmnings, 87 P. 2d 3G~J
Elaine v. Lloyd, 204 P. 2d 280
Wood v. Chicago & :ilil wa ukee Railroad Corn pan)·,
277 P. 2d 345
Tossman v. Newman, 233 P 2d 1
Taylor v. Jackson, 266 P 2d 605
Mays v. Ritchie, 5 S. W. 2d 728
Mulberry v. Turner, 174 N.E. 471
Highland v. Cobb, 169 N.E. 401
Lancaster v. B & H Coach Line, lGO

~.K 'ilG

In the light of the foregoing decisions we contenr1

that the Court was in error in not permitting Appellan!
to offer the evidence set forth in his offer of proof, an<l
in the Court's ruling that violation of this statute constitutes negligence per se.
Point II. Contributory Negligence of Respondent
and Proximate Cause. After Respondent had rested
her case, Appellant sought to offer evidence supporting
his defense of justification or excuse, already discu"e.d
under Point 1, and to off er evidence of Respondent·'
24

contributory negligence and proximate caus0. The
Court ruled that the only issue (outside of damages)
upon which he would receive evidence was the alleged
negligence of Richard Klafta and whether such negligence was the sole cause of the accident. This ruling
precludes Appellant from offering evidence of contributorr negligenef~ of Re::-;pondent and whether such neglig-ence, if proved, was a contributory cause of her injuries.
Tlie trial eourt hy its order of December 3, 1964, has
1ww withdrawn this issue from the jury.
We readily admit that an occupant of a car does
However, a passenl!'Pr riding in a car owes a duty to protect herself
against foreseeahle injuries. Her conduct is judged on
the universally applied standard of care, that of a reasonahle. prudent person ullder the circumstances, and in
moot instanees presents a question of fact for the jury.

not have the same duty as the driver.

Maybee v. Maybee, 79 Utah 585, 11 P. 2d 973.
Esernia v. Overland .Moving Co., 79 Utah 585
Edwards v. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215, 364 P. 2d 1015
vVhile Appellant was restricted in offering evidence
concerning Respondent's contributory negligence, yet
the evidence offered by Respondent and her witnesses
disclotwd the following: That Respondent was an experienced driver; she was riding in the front seat next
to her :"on; that Richard was driving at a speed of 50
miles per hour on low beam; that Richard in a written
0tatement said he was driving between 50 and 55 miles
per hour. It is significant that just before the accident
Respondent said to Richard, "Thank God for bringing
us this far in safety." ('rr. 62) The jury was not bound
25

to believe their testimony as to speed, espPciall~· wht·ii
there is physical evidence which suggests he was drivill"
b
at a much faster speed. Those facts developed 111
Respondent's own witnesses \Vere that he slanmie<l 011
his brakes, traveled 9' 8" with locked wheels, struck tlw
carcass and his car jumped three or four feet in tlw ai 1
and then traveled 120 feet with his left front wlieP!
locked the entire distance. From this Pvidence a jun
as trier of the facts could logically believe that lie \\'a.traveling at a much faster rate of speed than 30 mile.per hour. 'l'here is one other matter bearing 011 Respondent's negligence. She admits that she wore 1111
seat belt and that if she had it would have probablY
saved her from serious injuries. With the alanning
increase of deaths on the highway and tlw publicit;
through television, radio, newspapers and rnagazine'
and safety first organizations, all of which advise tlw
use of seat belts as a helpful media to prevent serinn>
injury to travelers in automobiles, it sePms to u,; thal
in applying the test of a reasonable and prudent per
son contemplating a trip from Kankakee, Illinois, tr.
Sacramento, California, in winter without taking thf
precaution of providing herself with a seat helt pre
sen ts a question of fact for the jury as to whether or not
Respondent was guilty of negligance, causing or con
tributing to her injuries. Our search of the authoritie>
has failed to find any case involving seat belts. However, our conclusion is based upon general tort law.
We suggest that this Honorable Court should he the
first to pass upon this interesting problem.
PROXIMATE CAUSE.
The authorities are almost unanimous m holding
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that one guilty of negligence is not liable unless said
negligence is tlie proximate cause of the accident and
that in most ca8es the question of proximate cause presents a que8tion of fact for the jury. The courts and
text writers have encountered difficulty in applying the
rule. 65 C.J.S. Sec. 103, page 645; 65 C.J.S. Sec. 104,
page 650. This Court has approved the following definition of proximate cause:
"The proximate cause of an injury is that
cause which in natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by any effective intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred. It is the active cause;
the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. It may operate
directly or by intervening agencies."
Kawagricki v. Bennett, 112 Utah 442, 189 P. 2d
109.
lt is the application of this rule to the facts in each
case which causes the confusion. We claim that the
fact~ in thiH caHe disclose that permitting the animal to
rscape was not a natural, continuous sequence, unbroken by a11y effective intervening cause, but on the contrary there were two effective intervening causes which
hroke the chain of causation, to wit, the negligence of
Cox, who killed the animal, and the negligence of Richard
Klafta in striking the carcass. Respondent in her original suit joined both Smith and Cox in separate causes
of action. In the second cause of action against Cox
'he alleges that lw was negligent in the following partirular~:
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''(a) After striking and killing said o!Pr·i
defendant negligently failed and nl·glPct1>r] t11
put out flares or otherwise give warning tr 1 ., .
"I'
proaching rnotorish; of the presern·e of said animal on said highway.
'' (b) Defendant failed and ne~leded to j111 _
mediately take steps to remove :-:aid stPe!' fr,.i1
said highway.
1

"'l'hat the foregoing acts of negligen<'l' on the
part of said defendant Cox caused the injurie»
damages and loss of which plaintiff eomplaim."
Cox was never served with :,;umm011s and did n11t
appear in said action. Respondent later amended hrr
complaint against Appellant by alleging a violation 111
Section 27-1-33 and Section 27-1-34, UCA 1953. At the
pre-trial preceding the second trial Respondent's couns1·l
advised the Court and counsel that they were ahancl11ning the common law negligence upon which their unsinal cause of action was based and also the issue a' tn
res ipsa loquititr, and would stand solidly on the ri11- ,
lation of the above statutes. At the conclusion of RPspondent's case Appellant offered in evidence the alle
gations contained in the second cause of action, on the
theory that this was a judicial admission on the part nl
Respondent and was relevant on the issue of proximatr· ,
cause. The Court sustained the objection by Respondent on the theory that Cox wa:,; not a party to the actiun
(Tr. 112). We think the Court was clearly in error. It
1

1

1

makes no difference whether Cox was in the ra'r "r
not. The que:,;tion is whether a statement of fact in 8
pleading is admissible is a judi<"ial admission.
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:H C.J.S. Evi<lence, Section 301, pagP 1071

v. Larkin, 110 F. 2d 226
Kirk v. Head, 152 S. W. 2d 726
Know le:; v. New Sweden, 101 Pac. 81.
~later

Respondent herself testified that there were no cars
tJa\•eling in front of them (Tr. 62). This being the case,
the Cox ('ar must have lwen traveling a considerable distance ahead of the Klafta car and Cox certainly could
have prevented the accident had he gone back a short
distance and flagged the oncoming Klafta car. Yet
under Re::;pondent's judicial admission he failed to do so.
'l'herefore, the negligence of Appellant, if any, was
li10ke11 by tlw intervening negligent act of Cox. It was
furt!iPr l>rokt·n by the intervening negligent act of
Jfo·lrnnl Klafta to be discussed under Point III. We
1·11nten<l that whether the alleged negligent act of Appellant was the proximate cause of the accident presents
a que~tion of fact which should be submitted to the jury
1in tlw n·trial of this action.
Point III. As heretofore noted, the trial court
ruled that the only issue, apart from damages, upon
ll'hich the trial <"ould proceed was the issue as to whether
11 r not Riehard Klafta was guilty of negligence which
wa~ t11P ~ole canse of the injury, and the Court sub111itted this issut· to the jm~· hut by his ruling of Decemh~r :3, 1%+, the Court has now taken that issue from the
.1un on thP rPtrial. We a:;sert that this issue presented
a que~tion of fact for the jury's determination. We
r(']y on the following cases:
Dalley r. Wirluesfer11 Dairy, 80 Utah 331, 15 P. 2d
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309, which lay8 down the following ruling:

"It has long been the rule in this stah• tlinl
it is negligence a8 a matter of law to drive an
automobile upon a traveled public highway at
such a rate of speed that said automobile t nttlrl
not be stopped within the distaneP at wl1ieh tliP
operator of such car is able to see objects uvon 1
the highway in front of him."
0

Hansen r. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 5G P. 2d 136ti, whmin

the Court, in applying the doctrine set forth in the Dalley case, says:

''Where a driver upon a puhlit highwa.1
with his light equipment cannot see more than ,
50 feet ahead of him it is hi8 duty to drin ai
such a speed as will enable him to stop within
that distance."
While the Dalley case has been criticize<l hy tlw lnte
Judge Wolfe, it has never been overruled. It i~ trul'
that this Court has narrowed its application by rea~rn1
of peculiar conditions, none of which are present in om
case. Richard Klafta admitted that he was driving at
such a rate of speed that he could not stop his car within
the distance at which he was able to see an animal l.1·ing
on the highway. This cow was no small object It
weighed about 1,200 pounds and stood about 4 foot
above the surface of the highway. He does not conteno
he was blinded by the lights of the oncoming truck,
which was 200 or 300 yards back of the point of the ac~.i
dent, but if he was then it was his duty to reduce lu~
speed so that he could see the dead animal on the hi~h
way and stop within his vision.
30

Appellant did not request the Court to instruct
the jury that Richard Klafta was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law, but left this question for the jury's
determination. If a jury should find, as weli they might,
that Richard Klafta as driving at a high rate of speed
with his lights on low beam then they could also find
that this negligence on his part was the sole causP
of the accident. We think, therefore, that the trial
court was correct in submitting this issue to the jury
and that he erred in his later ruling to the effect that
either Richard Klafta was not negligent or if negligent, his negligence was not the sole proximate cause
of the accident.
Point IV. Appellant contends that on the retrial
of this action he should be permitted to offer evidence
in support of each and all of the foregoing defenses
and that this Court should direct the trial court to submit each of said affirmative defenses to the jury for
their determination as questions of fact rather than
IJUestions of law for the Court.
Point V. Appellant contends that the trial court
erred in sustaining Respondent's objections to Appellant's proffered evidence in support of his defense
of justification or excuse and also his offer of Respondent's pleading set forth in her second cause of action,
for the reasons specifically set forth supra and fully discussed under Points I and II.
Point VJ. Appellant contends the Court erred in
instruction No. 9 wherein the Court quoted Section 271-33, Suh<livision (b), for the reason it is not applicable
to the undisputed facts in this case. Subdivision (b)
applies only to transportation of goods under cover and
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not to livestoek being transpol'ted in open rackb, Other.
wise, his instruetion on the one issue suhmitte<l to t;1,
jury appears to be proper. Appellant's complaint, ho 11.
ever, is that this issue has now been withdrawn from
the jury by virtue of the Court's ruling of Decernhrr l.
1964.
Point VII. Appellant submitted to thl' Court eight
requested instructions which covered his theory of hif
affirmative defenses. '11 he Court refused to give any
of these requested instructions, on the avparent throry
that each of these affirmative defenses, except as to
Richard Klaf ta's negligence, presented question' of
law for the Court. If the trial court was in error then
this Court should so indicate on this intermediate appeal
for the guidance of the trial court and eounsel on the
retrial of this action. We call the Court's particular
attention to Appellant's requested instruction No. 4. If
this Court adopts the California doctrine as to justifi
cation or excuse, then this requested instruetion 8l10ulrl
have been given as it has been repeatedly approved Iii
the Courts of California. The same is also true as t11
requested instructions No. 3 and 5. Each and all of
the other requested instructions relate to the other de·
fenses of contributory negligence of Respondent an,j
proximate cause.
Respectfully submitted,
LeROY B. YOUNG, of
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANll
1018 First Security Bank Bldg.
Ogden, Utah
GEORGE B. HANDY
517 David Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant 1111r.l ~i Ji J!el/a11I
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